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Abstract: Using a dataset of 15,000 subjects from 32 Western countries, the current study 
examines individuals who were raised in a certain religion and, at some stage of their lives, 
left it. Currently, they define their religious affiliation as ‘no religion’. A battery of 
explanatory variables (country-specific, personal attributes and marriage variables) was 
employed to test for determinants of this decision. It was found that the tendency of 
individuals to leave their religion—the most extreme symptom of secularization—is 
strongly correlated with their liberal beliefs and with parental and spousal religious 
characteristics. Moreover, country characteristics, as well as personal socio-demographic 
features seem to be much less relevant, except for the religious diversity of the country that 
has a positive effect on disaffiliation. 
Keywords: national aggregates; disaffiliation; Europe 
 
1. Introduction 
Religion and religiosity (like other cultural traits) affect numerous dimensions of the individual's 
socio-economic behavior: educational attainments [1–4]; labor force participation [5]; occupation [6]; 
income [7,8]; marriage and inter-faith marriage [9]; fertility [5,10–14]; as well as attitudes that are also 
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related to the labor market and other economic and social performance, such as attitudes of trust and 
risk [15,16], attitudes of cooperation [17] and work ethics, honesty and thrift [18]. Guiso et al. [19] 
provide a general overview of the effect of religiosity on economic attitudes. It follows that secularization 
is responsible for changes in socio-economic phenomena, such as: fertility, marriage patterns, female 
labor force participation and more. Understanding the patterns and determinants of secularization1 is 
therefore linked to a better understanding of socio-economic performance. 
The paper provides evidence about a relatively unexplored extreme symptom of secularization: 
disaffiliation (converting out).2 It is a wide-spreading phenomenon. For instance, based on our sample, 
in Great Britain, 39% who were raised in a religion left it at some stage in life and currently define 
their religious affiliation as ‘no religion’. The parallel figure for Germany is 20%. Obviously, a better 
understanding of the determinants of disaffiliation can help in forecasting future trends and their 
effects on economic outcomes. 
In order to identify the individuals who stepped out of their religious affiliation and to find out what 
are the factors that significantly affected this drastic move, a battery of explanatory variables was 
employed. The set included: (i) country-specific aggregates3: pluralism index, existence of state-religion, 
national average level of mass attendance and, finally, per-capita GDP; (ii) personal attributes that 
include: childhood and parental religious background, socio-economic and demographic personal 
determinants and attitudes and beliefs and (iii) marriage effects: marital status and spouse’s religion 
(for married individuals).  
The data used for the empirical analysis were drawn from the module on National Identity of the 
1998 International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II. The ISSP is an ongoing effort devoted 
to cross-country data collection on national attitudes. It includes questions on attitudes, beliefs and 
opinions on various issues, as well as numerous questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic 
background, together with information on parents and spouses. 15,000 individuals were sampled all 
around the world.4  
                                                 
1  The literature on secularization is large and extensive. [20–25] are some basic references. It covers diverse aspects, such 
as: (a) differentiation of society's major institutions (law, politics, economy, education, etc.) from religious influence; 
(b) rationalization [26,27]; (c) demystification of all spheres of life; and (d) less adherence to religious acts, such as 
attendance of religious services and prayer. See [28] for an inventory of the elements of the classic theories of 
secularization. Sommerville [24] sorted out the different aspects of secularization and divided them into two categories: 
those presented in terms of processes (like decline, differentiation, disengagement, rationalization) or in terms of 
aspects of life or levels of analyses (structural, cultural, organizational, individual). 
2  The terms 'converting out' and 'disaffiliation' will be used (interchangeably) for individuals who were raised in a 
religion and now define their denomination as 'no religion'. It is obviously an extreme act of secularization. 
3  Religiosity is affected by country-specific aggregates, such as: economic development and political institutions [18]; 
country religious pluralism and government restrictions on religious conversion [29]. In a study of 40 countries,  
Barro et al. [29] did not however find significant effects of per-capita GDP, the presence of a state religion and the 
extent of religiosity on conversion rates.  
4  The sample includes: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West Germany, East 
Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The Czech Republic, The Netherlands, The Philippines, The 
Slovak Republic and The United States. It appears that the samples of Australia, Cyprus and Israel do not include any 
respondent who disaffiliated. 
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Most of these countries are predominantly Christian (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and other 
Christian faiths); a small share of respondents grew up as Jews or as Moslems; and about 1% were 
raised in other non-Christian religions (see Table 1 for details). The data cover the European and 
Australian continents, as well North America. The African continent is excluded, and South America 
and Asia are represented by a small number of countries (Chile, Japan, Israel and the Philippines). The 
research is therefore pertaining to Europe, North-America and Australia and a few other countries. In 
addition, the more homogenous European and non-European subsamples are analyzed separately, and 
the results for the larger sample are compared with the results for these subsamples. 
Table 1. Sample characteristics. 
 All countries Europe Non-Europe 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE    
Converted out (%) 9.2 13.5 10.4 15.7 4.6 6.0 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
COUNTRY VARIABLES      
European country (%) 79.6 78.0 - - - - 
Pluralism index (range of 0–1) 0.37 (0.25) 0.37 (0.25) 0.33 (0.24) 0.34 (0.24) 0.50 (0.26) 0.50 (0.29) 
State-religion (%) 32.4 31.7 35.0 34.8 22.5 20.6 
Average country church 
attendance (att.) 
2.15 (0.78) 2.13 (0.77) 2.11 (0.76) 2.08 (0.76) 2.35 (0.79) 2.34 (0.79) 
Per capita GDP (US$) 15494.14 
(10319.1) 
15942.90 
(10486.8) 
15361.43 
(10250.3) 
15761.74 
(10381.1) 
- - 
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES       
Religious denomination (raised in)      
Catholic (%) 57.2 55.1 64.1 59.5 39.4 39.9 
Jewish (%) 4.3 4.3 0.1 0.2 21.0 18.9 
Moslem (%) 0.8 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.1 2.9 
Protestant (%) 27.8 28.6 24.4 28.6 29.5 28.4 
Orthodox (%) 7.7 7.4 9.8 9.4 0.2 0.2 
Other Christian (%) 1.3 1.6 0.7 0.9 4.0 4.1 
Other non-Christian (%) 0.9 1.6 0.3 0.4 3.8 5.6 
Religion homogamous house (%) 89.9 90.8 91.7 92.1 83.1 86.0 
Intensive church att. at 12 (%) 56.8 50.6 56.5 50.0 57.7 52.9 
Age 45.64 
(15.17) 
48.95 
(15.21) 
45.97 
(15.25) 
49.02 
(15.24) 
44.35 
(14.78) 
48.71 
(15.11) 
Last school attended       
Elementary (%) 25.1 24.4 27.5 26.0 16.1 18.4 
High School (%) 39.7 39.5 38.6 39.1 43.9 41.1 
Academic (%) 35.2 36.1 33.9 34.9 40.0 40.5 
“Extramarital sex relations” view      
Always wrong (%) 67.9 59.0 65.2 55.3 78.3 71.9 
Almost always wrong (%) 19.9 23.3 20.7 24.8 16.8 17.9 
Wrong only sometimes (%) 8.9 12.1 10.2 13.5 4.0 7.3 
Not wrong at all (%) 3.3 5.6 3.9 6.4 0.9 2.9 
Religions 2013, 4                    
 
 
170
Table 1. Cont.  
“Homosexual relations” view       
Always wrong (%) 53.5 59.0 50.9 56.2 63.5 68.6 
Almost always wrong (%) 8.6 9.6 8.7 10.0 8.4 8.2 
Wrong only sometimes (%) 11.3 10.1 12.0 10.7 8.6 8.1 
Not wrong at all (%) 26.6 21.3 28.4 23.1 19.5 15.1 
Believe in Heaven       
Yes, definitely (%) 37.2 29.5 32.7 25.0 54.5 45.5 
Yes, probably (%) 28.4 24.4 29.3 24.1 25.2 25.3 
No, probably not (%) 15.8 17.8 17.1 19.1 10.8 13.2 
No, definitely not (%) 18.6 28.3 20.9 31.8 9.5 16.0 
Believe in Hell       
Yes, definitely (%) 28.6 23.3 24.5 18.8 44.5 39.4 
Yes, probably (%) 22.4 20.1 22.3 19.5 22.9 22.0 
No, probably not (%) 20.3 21.0 21.3 22.0 16.5 17.6 
No, definitely not (%) 28.7 35.6 31.9 39.7 16.1 21.0 
Believe in Miracles        
Yes, definitely (%) 33.5 25.5 31.2 23.0 42.4 34.1 
Yes, probably (%) 29.0 26.7 29.3 26.4 28.0 27.8 
No, probably not (%) 17.6 19.5 18.1 19.9 15.6 18.1 
No, definitely not (%) 19.9 28.3 21.4 30.7 14.0 20.0 
MARRIAGE ATTRIBUTES       
Married (%) 85.6 89.2 83.9 88.1 92.2 93.2 
Spouse has same religion as 
respondent was raised in (%) 
79.4 81.8 79.5 81.5 79.0 82.9 
Spouse has 'no religion' (%) 7.2 5.7 7.4 6.4 6.2 3.5 
Sample Size 7895 7258 6287 5660 1608 1598 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
To conclude, this paper offers a new perspective on the growing body of literature on the phenomenon 
of secularization, focusing on the most extreme evidence of secularization, namely, disaffiliation. 
2. Dataset, Variables and Methodology 
2.1. Sample and Dataset 
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is a unique multidisciplinary and cross-country 
database of micro data on national attitudes. It includes questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on 
various issues, as well as numerous questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic background. 
It also has rich data on the religiosity of parents, respondents and spouses. 
The sample is composed of Christians: Catholics—48.7%; Protestants—23.7%; Orthodox—7.2%; a 
small share of respondents are Jewish (4.3%) or Moslem (1.1%); about 1.8% have other Christian 
religions; about 1.2% have other religions (e.g., Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu, Shinto); and 11.3% identify 
themselves as having ‘no religion’. 
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Regressions were estimated using pooled country data, under the assumption that the effects of the 
independent variables are not different in the various countries included in the sample. The pooling of 
the data led to a very large sample (sample sizes within each of the countries were too small to allow a 
separate analysis for each country). Country-specific variables were used to identify and control for 
country effects.5  
The analysis is replicated for the more homogeneous subsamples of European and  
non-European countries.  
2.2. Variables 
2.2.1. The Dependent Variable  
This was defined using information derived from two questions: "What was your religion when you 
were a child?" and "What is your current religion?" It relates to disaffiliation and is defined as: 
Disaffiliation = 1 for respondents who were raised in a religion and currently 
claim to have 'no religion' 
 = 0 otherwise 
The last group includes those who were raised in a religion and currently have the same religion or 
a different religion. Those who were raised in 'no religion' were excluded from the analysis. This 
phenomenon is larger for males (13.5%) than for females (9.2%), and it is larger in Europe than in the 
whole sample. Some basic descriptive are shown in Table 1. 
Several sets of variables were introduced in order to identify and explore the determinants  
of disaffiliation.  
2.2.2. Country-Specific Variables 
First, in order to capture possible differences in disaffiliation in European countries versus other 
countries (Japan, Israel, The Philippines, Chile, New-Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United 
States), due to different cultures, we define a dummy variable for respondents residing in European 
countries: European country dummy. 
Second, we focus on religious competition (pluralism) and the existence of a state-religion (see [30]): 
 The P index represents religious pluralism (diversity) and is defined as P = 1-HHI, where HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration.6 The larger P is, the more religiously diverse 
the country is said to be; 
 The existence of a state-religion.7  
Additionally, we add a variable that reflects country-level religious adherence: 
                                                 
5  Another option was to use fixed-effects regression models. The basic results for the core variables did not change when 
fixed-effects were used. 
6  Defined as HHI =

n
i
is
1
2 , the sum of squares of the shares of the country’s religious denominations. It follows that P 
ranges between 0 (if everyone belongs to the same religion) and (almost) 1 (if there are a large number of religions, each 
of which covers a negligible fraction of the population). See also [31,32], who refer to the same diversity/pluralism index. 
7  [33] provides a comprehensive country-by-country study on the adoption and abandonment of state-religions over time. 
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 The country average level of church (religious services) attendance: the variable “church 
attendance” is measured on a scale of 1-to-6, ranging from ‘not attending at all’ to ‘attending at 
least once a week’.8 Using this variable, the country average has been calculated. The country 
average is a continuous variable. Another indicator of the country-level religiosity is the average 
prayer level (scale of 1–11). However, adding this variable led to multicollinearity, due to a high 
correlation between country average church attendance and country-average prayer (a correlation 
coefficient of 0.84). 
Finally, to control the country's level of development (see [20,34]), we add: per-capita GDP. 
2.2.3. Personal Attributes 
The ISSP-98 contains some basic socio-demographic questions for each responder: 
 Present age: obviously, the more relevant variable is the age of disaffiliation and not the current 
age. Unfortunately, respondents were not asked when they converted out.9 We also include  
age-squared to allow for a non-linear (parabolic) relationship; 
 Education: last school attended; elementary (reference category); high school; and academic 
education institution. 
Interestingly, the ISSP includes two questions about attitudes regarding norms of behavior:  
 One is related to extra-marital sexual relations. The question’s phrasing was: for a married 
person to have sexual relations with someone other than her/his husband or wife is: (1) always 
wrong (reference category); (2) almost always wrong; (3) wrong only sometimes; or (4) not 
wrong at all. 
 The other question refers to homosexual relations: sexual relations between two adults of the 
same sex is: (same four options as above.)  
The basic idea is that individuals who are more liberal are more prone to convert out and become 
non-religious. Additionally, churches condemn extra-marital and homosexual relations, and therefore, 
individuals who hold liberal views on these 'unmoral' issues may feel 'rejected' by the church and, 
consequently, have a higher tendency to disaffiliate. 
Finally, the most important feature of the ISSP-98 is the battery of individual questions regarding 
religious performance: 
 Religious denomination in which the subject was educated; 
                                                 
8  The term 'church' is used as a generic term that relates to the relevant religious place of worship (e.g., also synagogue 
for Jews, mosque for Moslems, etc.). The religious rules of congregation vary between religions (e.g., many orthodox 
Jews congregate once or even twice a day, while Christians congregate once a week). 
9  Nevertheless, current age embodies cohort effects: secularization was not common decades ago and has increased in 
recent years. Assuming that most individuals convert out in their 20s or 30s, because young people are more 
revolutionary, it follows that older people (e.g., above the age of 60) belong to a cohort of a period when secularization 
was less common and, therefore, have a lower tendency to disaffiliate. 
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 Using information regarding the religious affiliation of the father and mother, we defined the 
variable: raised in a religious homogamous household, that equals 1 if the father and mother had 
the same religion (when the respondent was a child); 
 Information on exposure to church (religious) services during childhood, that includes nine 
alternative levels, was used to define the dummy variable: intensive religious practice during 
childhood = 1,10 for original values of: seven (attended almost every week), eight (every week) 
and nine (several times a week).  
The ISSP also includes a number of questions about beliefs in some basic religious doctrines: 
 Belief in heaven; 
 Belief in hell; 
 Belief in miracles.  
The question: “do you believe in heaven/hell/miracles” had four alternative answers—(1) yes, 
definitely (reference category); (2) yes, probably; (3) no, probably not; and (4) no, definitely not. It is 
assumed that non-believers have a higher tendency to leave their religion.  
2.2.4. Marriage Effects 
For this variable, we have three key measures: 
 Marital status (married = 1; 0 otherwise); 
 Spouse has the same denomination as the respondent was raised in; 
 Spouse has 'no religion'. 
2.3. Method 
The dependent variable, yij, is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if respondent i was raised in any 
religion and currently has 'no religion' and 0 otherwise; the subscript, j, is the respondent’s country 
index. The vector of independent variables, xij, includes the variables described in the previous section.  
A logit random-effects model with a cluster-robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix11 
was estimated: 
ܲൣݕ௜௝ ൌ 1 / ݔ௜௝, ߚ, ߙ௝൧ ൌ Λ൫ߙ௝ ൅ ݔ௜௝ᇱ ߚ൯ (1) 
where Λሺݖሻ ൌ ௘೥ଵା௘೥; ߙ௝ is the country-specific random-effect that is assumed to have a normal 
distribution, ߙ௝ → ܰሺ0, ߪఈଶሻ.12 
                                                 
10  The ISSP question is: "when you were 12 years old, how often did you attend religious services?" The options are: 
never (1); once a year (2); one or two times a year (3); a few times a year (4); once a month (5); two or three times a 
month (6), almost every week (7); every week (8); several times a week (9). 
11  Standard errors at the country level were clustered. The random-effects (RE) model also considers the (ceteris paribus) 
different behavior of respondents from different countries that stem from the country-specific culture and norms. A RE 
model seems to be more appropriate than an FE (fixed-effects) model. Moreover, using an FE model does not allow for 
the inclusion of country-specific variables (that have no within-country variation), such as religious pluralism of the 
country (P), which are core variables in our study. 
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In the following, 'converting out' regressions were estimated separately for women and men. Given 
that the European dummy variable had a significant coefficient, expressing differences in disaffiliation 
between European and non-European countries, we also ran separate regressions for these subsamples. 
3. Findings 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics: Sample Characteristics 
Before proceeding to report the results, the characteristics of the samples used for the regression 
analysis are described. Table 1 presents means of the variables used for the econometric analysis. They 
are presented for the female and male samples, and a distinction is also made between the larger 
sample and the European and non-European subsamples. 
The means are similar for the general sample and the European subsample. Gender differences in 
each subsample are also small. Approximately 9% of the women and 14% of the men converted out: 
they were raised within a religion and currently claim to have 'no religion'. The figures are larger 
within the European countries (10.4% of the women and 15.7% of the men) and smaller within the 
non-European countries (4.6% of the women and 6% of the men). Interestingly, Shy [35], who 
processed data from the World Christian Encyclopedia [36] and calculated the percentage of secular 
people (non-religious and atheists combined) in Europe in the year 2000, arrived at a similar 
percentage, around 15% (Table 1, page 1, 130). 
The somewhat lower percentage of women who converted out is in line with theories and findings 
of other studies showing that women are generally more religious [14,37–42].  
The majority of respondents were raised in Christian denominations:13 about 56% of respondents 
were raised as Catholics, around 28% grew up as Protestants and around 8% as Orthodox. About 1.2% 
were Moslem, 4.3% Jewish (0.1% in Europe) and 2.7% had other religions.  
Focusing on those who converted out, the distribution of their original denominations is the 
following: Catholic—53.7%; Protestant—39.9%; Orthodox—2.9%; Jewish—0.3%; Moslem—0.3%; 
and 3% had other religions.  
The countries are not very diverse in terms of existing religions: a pluralism index of 0.37 (0.33 in 
Europe) indicates limited diversity, being higher in non-European countries (0.50). Around one third 
of the countries have a state-religion. The average per-capita GDP in the sampled countries is 15–16 
thousand US$. 
An examination of the average levels of religious practice shows that despite rapid secularization, 
the populations are still adhering to mass services and even more so to prayer habits. The mass 
attendance average is above 2.1 on a scale of 1-to-6. The average prayer level is above 5.6 on a scale 
of 1-to-11, but is not included in the regression analysis, due to the high correlation with the mass 
attendance variable. 
Women seem to be more religious in terms of belief in the religious doctrines of heaven, hell and 
miracles. However, a considerable percentage of the two genders do not believe in these doctrines: 
                                                                                                                                                                       
12  The sign of the β estimates relates to the direction of the marginal effects (positive or negative). Based on the estimates 
of the β coefficients, odd-ratios will be calculated and presented. 
13  Data reported on page 4 refers to current religion (not the one a person is raised in). 
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about 32% (29% of the women and 36% of the men) do not believe in hell. This percentage is smaller 
for non-European countries (16.1% for women and 21% for men). Around 19% of the women and 
over 28% of the men do not believe in each of the other two doctrines. One can observe a kind of 
wishful believing: the percentage of non-believers in hell is much larger compared to non-believers in 
the two 'positive' doctrines. Brañas-Garza et al. [43] find that afterlife beliefs have a crucial role in 
religious performance for both females and males. 
An examination of childhood religious background shows that close to 90% of the participants grew 
up in households where the two parents belonged to the same denomination. More than half of the 
respondents were exposed to intensive religious practice when they were aged 12 and attended church 
services on a regular basis.  
Focusing on individuals currently married, we observe that over 80% have a spouse with the same 
religious denomination that the respondent was raised in, and around 7% have a spouse that declares 
having 'no religion'. 
The socio-demographic characteristics of our sample are as follows: the age average is 47 years. 
Over 36% have an academic education (at least partial). 
'Married' is still the most common marital status; about 87% of respondents are married. Over 24% 
consider that homosexual relationships are not wrong at all, but only about 4.4% think that extramarital 
sexual relations are completely acceptable. Interestingly, women are more liberal when it comes to 
homosexual relations and have a less liberal attitude towards extramarital sex relations. 
3.2. Regression Results 
Table 2 below presents logit “converting out” regressions for women and men for both the whole 
sample and the European and non-European subsamples. Recall that the dependent variable is 
dichotomous (taking the value 1 if the respondent was raised in a religion and currently has 'no 
religion' and 0 otherwise). The reported coefficients are the odd-ratios of the various variables14.  
Starting with the country-specific explanatory variables: the results indicate a significant  
difference in the tendency to disaffiliate between the larger samples and the European subsamples. 
Respondents who reside in a European country have a much higher probability to convert out 
compared to non-Europeans.  
Figure 1 jointly plots the national means of converting out versus the pluralism index. There seems 
to be a positive relationship between these two country averages. Our data advocate that indeed there is 
a clear strong correlation between religious pluralism of a country and the tendency of its population to 
convert out and abandon any religious affiliation:15 More religiously diverse countries have much 
higher rates of disaffiliation. This is evidenced by the positive effect of the religious pluralism index 
(odds-ratios of 10–11 for the whole sample and over seven for the European subsample; within the 
European sample, it is significant only at the 10% significance level). We can therefore conclude that 
                                                 
14  For high correlation between GDP and the P-index in the no-Europe subsample, we have removed the first one of the 
regressions. 
15  Having state-regulation, however, does not affect the tendency to convert out. 
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our findings do not support supply-side theories.16 Quite the contrary, we find clear evidence in favor 
of the demand-side, sociological approaches: a greater diversity does not stimulate greater religious 
participation, but rather secularization and disaffiliation. 
Figure 1. Converting out as a function of religious pluralism. 
 
National “religious capital”, expressed by higher national averages of mass attendance, does not affect 
secularization. 17 In contrast to Weberian ideas, we find that national economic development (captured 
by per-capita GDP) is uncorrelated with converting out (the odds-ratios are equal to 1 and insignificant). 
Regarding personal attributes, we see that the religious denomination the respondent was raised in 
(Catholic, as the reference) plays a minor role. Denomination effects are significant only for males. 
Men raised in the Protestant denomination have a lower tendency to convert out (compared to 
Catholics: odds ratio of 0.7 in the larger sample and 0.6 within the European subsample). On the other 
hand, men who were raised in the Orthodox or the ‘Other Christian’ denominations have much higher 
tendencies to convert out (odds ratios of over two). In the non-European subsamples, the findings are 
different. Moslem and Protestant women have a higher tendency to convert out. 
Exposure to more homogeneous and intensive religious practice during childhood leads to a lower 
tendency to convert out and move to the 'no religion' sector: respondents who grew up with parents 
who shared the same religious denomination are less prone to convert out (odds ratios of about 0.8 for 
women and 0.6 for men); experiencing intensive church attendance at the age of 12 further reduces the 
probability to convert out (odds ratio of about 0.8 for women and 0.6 for men). Sherkat and  
Wilson [47] used the concept ‘adaptive preferences’ and claimed that socialization through childhood 
religious practice will create preferences upon which later religious choices will be made. It follows 
that more exposure to childhood religious socialization will decrease the likelihood of secularization 
later on in life. 
 
 
                                                 
16  The supply-side theory indicates that religious diversity would stimulate churches to ‘produce’ religious services well 
adapted to the needs of religious consumers, thereby increasing ‘consumption’ (see [44–46]). 
17  These results seem to indicate that consumption motives (churches are places where people can socialize) and 
professional motives (churches serve as social networks) are not important to individuals who decide to convert out. 
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Table 2. Logit regressions of disaffiliation (odds ratios). 
  All countries Europe No Europe 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VARIABLES   
a) Religious strictness       
 Residence in a European country 4.23 (0.030) 7.29 (0.004) - - - - 
 Pluralism index 10.54 (0.039) 11.93 (0.04) 6.48 (0.065) 7.40 (0.093) 3.63 (0.886) 3722.72 (0.177) 
 State religion 0.70 (0.514) 0.81 (0.732) 0.86 (0.749) 1.00 (0.998) 0.00 (1.000) 0.00 (1.000) 
b)Religious adherence       
 Country average Mass 1.06 (0.865) 1.59 (0.212) 0.92 (0.803) 1.38 (0.369) 0.46 (0.778) 10.51 (0.193) 
c)GDP/1,000 1.04 (0.075) 1.04 (0.100)  1.03 (0.142) 1.04 (0.115) - - 
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES   
a) Religion (raised in)        
Denomination                 Catholic Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Jewish 0.48 (0.459) 0.37 (0.226) 0.00 (1.000) 2.14 (0.521) 7.84 (0.182) 0.00 (1.000) 
 Moslem 1.42 (0.682) 0.96 (0.950) 0.53 (0.581) 0.59 (0.536) 29.01 (0.017) 7.58 (0.105) 
 Protestant 1.20 (0.197) 0.71 (0.017) 1.02 (0.907) 0.59 (0.001) 2.65 (0.036) 2.11 (0.072) 
 Orthodox 1.45 (0.422) 2.85 (0.015) 1.25 (0.642) 2.52 (0.044) 0.00 (1.000) 0.00 (1.000) 
 Other Christian 2.27 (0.081) 2.63 (0.011) 2.42 (0.071) 2.01 (0.090) 1.02 (0.994) 24.40 (0.003) 
 Other non-Christian 1.88 (0.277) 2.79 (0.060) 1.960 (0.319) 2.16 (0.220) 1.20 (0.950) 36.44 (0.012) 
Religiously homogamous household 0.75 (0.038) 0.55 (0.000) 0.81 (0.175) 0.51 (0.000) 0.38 (0.018) 0.86 (0.717) 
Intensive church attendance at 12 0.80 (0.052) 0.64 (0.000) 0.78 (0.045) 0.59 (0.000) 0.88 (0.768) 0.79 (0.507) 
b) Socio-demographic attributes       
Age 1.03 (0.191) 1.00 (0.869) 1.02 (0.486) 1.00 (0.860) 1.37 (0.007) 1.22 (0.021) 
Age squared 1.00 (0.078) 1.00 (0.550) 1.00 (0.226) 1.00 (0.803) 1.00 (0.008) 1.00 (0.025) 
      
Last school attended   Elementary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High School 0.96 (0.810) 1.27 (0.102) 0.94 (0.713) 1.28 (0.098) Ref. 0.55 (0.403) 
Academic 1.00 (0.995) 1.38 (0.032) 0.94 (0.736) 1.42 (0.023) 1.66 (0.261) 0.67 (0.561) 
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Table 2. Cont.  
c) Beliefs        
“Extra-marital sex” view   Always wrong Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Almost always wrong 0.99 (0.918) 1.40 (0.003) 0.97 (0.845) 1.30 (0.031) 1.10 (0.832) 2.84 (0.005) 
Wrong only sometimes 1.69 (0.001) 1.62 (0.000) 1.69 (0.001) 1.70 (0.000) 1.41 (0.616) 0.91 (0.859) 
Not wrong at all 2.11 (0.001) 1.63 (0.007) 2.10 (0.002) 1.80 (0.001) 4.49 (0.310) 0.08 (0.029) 
       
“Homosexual relationship” view 
Always wrong 
Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Almost always wrong 0.85 (0.468) 1.35 (0.064) 0.92 (0.698) 1.39 (0.053) 0.29 (0.184) 1.31 (0.630) 
Wrong only sometimes 1.19 (0.297) 1.27 (0.120) 1.18 (0.364) 1.25 (0.175) 1.35 (0.611) 1.60 (0.396) 
Not wrong at all 1.82 (0.000) 1.69 (0.000) 1.82 (0.000) 1.66 (0.000) 1.97 (0.183) 2.92 (0.014) 
       
Believe in Heaven         Yes, definitely Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Yes, probably 1.47 (0.136) 1.55 (0.171) 1.46 (0.176) 1.70 (0.127) 0.93 (0.919) 2.01 (0.454) 
No, probably not 3.19 (0.000) 4.02 (0.000) 2.66 (0.001) 3.86 (0.000) 15.55 (0.000) 7.63 (0.072) 
No, definitely not 6.18 (0.000) 8.52 (0.000) 5.78 (0.000) 7.37 (0.000) 14.50 (0.005) 125.76 (0.000) 
       
Believe in Hell           Yes, definitely Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Yes, probably 0.99 (0.991) 0.63 (0.206) 0.94 (0.850) 0.59 (0.193) 1.30 (0.776) 0.31 (0.198) 
No, probably not 0.96 (0.885) 0.60 (0.153) 1.02 (0.945) 0.69 (0.333) 0.52 (0.454) 0.12 (0.063) 
No, definitely not 1.03 (0.923) 0.55 (0.070) 0.99 (0.968) 0.68 (0.277) 1.18 (0.865) 0.024 (0.002) 
       
Believe in Miracles        Yes, definitely Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Yes, probably 1.11 (0.624) 1.55 (0.071) 0.98 (0.942) 1.46 (0.136) 2.47 (0.170) 4.24 (0.056) 
No, probably not 1.85 (0.005) 2.29 (0.001) 1.78 (0.012) 2.06 (0.005) 2.22 (0.258) 7.84 (0.009) 
No, definitely not 2.31 (0.000) 4.12 (0.000) 2.26 (0.000) 3.79 (0.000) 2.46 (0.263) 16.95 (0.001) 
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Table 2. Cont.  
MARRIAGE EFFECTS   
Married 0.48 (0.000) 0.57 (0.000) 0.46 (0.000) 0.59 (0.001) 2.60 (0.245) 0.51 (0.297) 
Spouse has same religion as respondent 
was raised in
0.43 (0.000) 0.37 (0.000) 0.44 (0.000) 0.36 (0.000) 0.28 (0.007) 0.35 (0.009) 
Spouse has 'no religion' 4.23 (0.000) 6.01 (0.000) 4.13 (0.000) 5.77 (0.000) 6.44 (0.000) 9.32 (0.000) 
 SAMPLE SIZE 7895 7258 6287 5660 1608 1598 
 AIC 2975 3455 2672 3076 309 387 
 BIC 3233 3710 2915 3315 492 576 
 Joint significance of age Χ2 (p-value) 8.27 (0.016) 6.10 (0.047) 8.53 (0.014) 5.67 (0.059) 7.37 (0.025) 5.41 (0.067) 
p-values in parenthesis; Ref. means reference category. 
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Our findings are in line with Bibby [48], who also presented data supporting the positive effect of a 
religiously heterogeneous household on secularization: the Canadian Census data for 1991 showed (for 
example) that while only six percent of children born to parents who were both Christian had  
no religious affiliation, the share rose to 31% if the children were raised by parents with mixed 
Catholic-Jewish affiliations. However, the notion that childhood socialization factors can predict 
religion switching18 is still open to debate, and the literature reports mixed evidence regarding the 
effect of exposure to religiosity on secularization. Loveland [41], who used the 1988 General Social 
Survey (GSS), found that joining a church while growing up acted to stabilize religious preferences, 
but greater levels of childhood religious socialization (measured by attendance of a religious school, 
Sunday School attendance and saying grace before meals) were not significant deterrents of  
religious switching (page 152). Sherkat [40] reached similar conclusions regarding the attendance of 
Sunday Schools and other formal child religious training—they did not reduce the likelihood of 
religious switching.  
Personal socio-economic endowments have a minor effect on disaffiliation. Current age (that 
represents cohort effects) is significant only for women,19 with a parabolic (inverted U) relationship 
between age and disaffiliation. Higher education (academic) positively affects disaffiliation of 
European men only.20  
Liberal beliefs are significantly correlated with the probability to convert out; liberal views over 
extramarital sex relations and homosexual relations increase the probability of converting out, and it is 
larger for women. Very similar effects were found within the European subsample, but not in the  
non-European one. One interesting example is that 26% of European males who think that extramarital 
relationships are not wrong at all convert out. The parallel figure for the non-European males is as low 
as 4.5%. 
Similar effects are observed regarding belief in the religious doctrine of miracles. Non-belief in 
Heaven leads to an even more pronounced increase in disaffiliation.  
There are strong marriage effects, related to the spouse's religious affiliation: first, married 
individuals have a lower probability to convert out (odds ratios of around 0.5), except for the  
non-European subsample. Married individuals who share the same denomination as their spouses have 
lower odds of conversion out (odds ratios around 0.4), while those married to a spouse with 'no 
religion' have much higher odds of conversion out (odd ratios of about four for women and around six 
                                                 
18  [49] and [9] are examples of economic approaches to cultural (religious) transmission of values and norms from parents 
to their offspring. 
19  See last row in Table 2. 
20  Roof [38], based on GSS 1988, also found that religion switchers tended to be male and well educated. A closely related 
topic is the relationship between education and religious attendance. It appears that it fluctuates highly among countries: 
In the United States, church attendance rises with education [50]. Sacerdote and Glaeser [51], who examined 69 
countries using the General Social Survey (GSS) 1972–1998, reported that in England and France, they found a positive 
relationship. However, in most countries, there was no significant relationship between education and religious 
attendance, whereas in the former socialist countries, the connection was generally strongly negative. Te Grotenhuis 
and Scheepers [52] and Brañas-Garza and Neuman [42] arrived at insignificant coefficients of schooling in mass 
participation equations for the Netherlands and Spain, respectively. 
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for men).21 These results are in line with findings reported in studies on similar topics: Te Grotenhuis 
and Scheepers [52], who used an event history analysis (based on retrospective data containing 
information on events that took place in the lives of the respondents since adolescence), found that in 
The Netherlands, the most significant factor in an attempt to explain disaffiliation was having a partner 
who does not belong to a religious group. Respondents whose partners were non-members of the 
church were 12-times more likely to become non-members themselves compared to respondents with a 
religiously affiliated partner. Voas [54] found that in Britain, religious affiliation tends to be lost 
following marriage to someone from a different religion. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Using ISSP-1998 data, this paper explored the determinants of religious disaffiliation, that is, 
determinants of individuals who were raised in a particular religion and currently define their religious 
affiliation as ‘no religion’. This is the extreme case of secularization.  
Our logit regressions employed a large array of explanatory variables: country specific variables, 
personal attributes and marriage characteristics. Table 3 summarizes the results. 
It was found that the tendency of individuals to leave their religion is: 
i. strongly correlated with parental household religious homogamy; 
ii. strongly correlated with the spouse's religious characteristics; 
iii. highly correlated with beliefs and personal views; 
iv. but, only marginally correlated with personal socio-economic features and with country features, 
except for the country religious diversity, which has a positive effect 
Table 3. Summary of regression results: effects of explanatory variables on the probability 
to convert out. 
(+) effects (-) effects 
Country effects 
Residence in a European country  
Religious Pluralism  
Personal attributes 
Orthodox (males) Protestant (males)  
Academic education (males) Homogamous parental households 
Liberal views Intensive church attendance at 12  
Religious disbeliefs  
Marriage effects 
Spouse has 'no religion' Married 
 Spouse same religion 
                                                 
21  What we find is a positive relationship between disaffiliation of the respondent and the affiliation of her/his spouse that 
has 'no religion'. We do not have information on the date of disaffiliation of the respondent (and his spouse if the spouse 
is also with 'no religion'), whether it was before or after marriage. It is, therefore, not possible to distinguish between 
cause and effect: perhaps the subjects converted out when single and, then, naturally, married someone with a 'no 
religion' affiliation. Regarding marriage effects, see [53]. 
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A comparison of the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) of several models, where we have 
removed variables by blocks, reinforces our findings. In Tables 4 and 5, we present the BIC of six 
models, where “X” indicates that the marked block is in the regression. As the Tables clearly indicate, 
when we remove country, religion or socio-demographic variable blocks, the models improve; that is, 
BIC is lower than in the full model. On the other hand, when belief or marriage variable blocks are 
removed, the models are poorer. It, therefore, appears that the close intimate relationship with parents 
and spouse are the major determinants of disaffiliation. The basic results are not quite different 
between the larger sample, which is composed of respondents from diverse different religions and the 
European and non-European subsamples. This similarity suggests that the disaffiliation phenomenon 
has common universal elements.  
Table 4. Bayesian information criteria (BIC) for females, all countries. 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5  MODEL 6 
COUNTRY SPECIFIC VARIABLES X  X X X X 
RELIGION VARIABLES  X X  X X X 
SOCIO-DEMO VARIABLES  X X X  X X 
BELIEF VARIABLES X X X X  X 
MARIAGE VARIABLES X X X X X  
BIC 3233 3199 3177 3206 3522 3505 
Table 5. BIC for males, all countries. 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5  MODEL 6 
COUNTRY SPECIFIC VARIABLES X  X X X X 
RELIGION VARIABLES  X X  X X X 
SOCIO-DEMO VARIABLES  X X X  X X 
BELIEF VARIABLES X X X X  X 
MARIAGE VARIABLES X X X X X  
BIC 3710 3676 3705 3689 4177 4102 
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